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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
is the state or any municipal corporation, or any public officer prosecut-
ing on behalf of said municipal corporation, or the Federal government,
or any of its agencies, the sum of twenty-six dollars .. ."I The rule
as amended reads, ". . . except when the petitioner is the state, or
a county, city, town, or school district thereof, or any public officer
prosecuting on behalf of the state or one of such municipal cor-
porations. . .. ""
VINCENT L. GADBOW
Appellate Procedure-Appeal Bond--Cash Deposit in Lieu of. In Salter v. Heiser,
143 Wash. Dec. 182, 260 P.2d 882 (1953), a certificate was filed with the clerk stating
that cash had been deposited with the clerk of the superior court in lieu of a bond on
appeal. The cash referred to had been deposited on prior appeals, $1400 of which had
not been withdrawn. The court held that even though money was on deposit with the
clerk, the money had not been subjected to the conditions of an appeal bond in the
instant appeal and thus did not constitute a deposit in lieu of a bond in conformance with
Rule on Appeal 22, 34A Wn.2d (1951 amend.).
PROPERTY
Real Property-Mistake as to Boundary Line-Hostile Intent
Requirement in Adverse Possession. Brown v. Hubbard' was an
action to quiet title by adverse possession to a strip of land eight and
one-half feet wide lying between the property of the plaintiff and that
of the defendant, but wholly within the boundaries described by the
defendant's deed. The plaintiff's predecessor in interest testified that,
without the intention of taking any property belonging to another, she
marked off what she thought to be the true boundary by a hedge and
placed a rabbit pen and haphazardly piled rocks upon the land in dis-
pute in the belief that this was in fact her property. The plaintiff and
defendant testified that certain conversations with reference to the
boundary took place at least twelve years following the definition of
the boundary by the plaintiff's predecessor. In these conversations the
plaintiff pointed out the true boundary as recently indicated to him by
a third party and indicated that he would "have" to remove his hedge.
Subsequent to this conversation and upon an attempted interference
by the defendant this action was brought.
Upon appeal from a judgment for the defendant the court de-
clared that the plaintiff's possession must be actual and uninterrupted,
open and notorious, hostile and exclusive, and under a claim of right
05 RULE ON APPEAL 57, 34A Wn.2d 62.
61 RvLE ON APPEAL 57, 34A Wn.2d Supp. 6 (1953 Amend.).
142 Wn. 2d 867, 259 P.2d 391 (1953).
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made in good faith; and upheld the trial court's finding that the inten-
tion of the plaintiff was not to claim more than his title deed called for
and therefor his holding was not adverse nor under a claim of right.
The court, in the leading Washington decision dealing with this prob-
lem, stated, "... the question of adverse possession is one of fact; and,
though the fence may have been established originally by mistake, if
it were followed by a claim to the land and such acts as clearly evinced
a determination of permanent proprietorship, the claim is established.
The intention of the party'claiming adverse possession, and also the
notice of such claim to the real owner, must be inferred from .the acts
and declarations of the parties."2 In determining that the possession
was adverse, the court looked to the acts of the claimant in improving
the land as indicative of his intent to claim up to the mistakenly estab-
lished boundary line. In other cases the declarations of the claimant
have been looked upon by the court as indicative of the lack of hostile
intent where, during the running of the statutory period, the claimant
has made statements to the adjoining owner indicating acquiescence to
a survey to determine the true boundary and the removal of any en-
croachments upon such determination.' Also possession under mistake
as to the location of a boundary line has been held adverse in the face
of testimony by the claimant that he intended to claim only what was
rightfully his.' In these decisions the court has (1) sought the objective
rather than the subjective intent, and (2) treated the intent objectively
shown as controlling, without regard to the existence of an uncommuni-
cated intention to claim only to the location of the true line, unless
there is affirmative evidence that the true line is to be subsequently
determined, and when determined, is to be recognized. Subjective intent
in terms of frame of mind uncommunicated during the running of the
statutory period has seemingly been treated as immaterial in final
determination of the hostility of possession.
It is to be noted in the Brown case that the acts of the claimant in
planting the hedge and building the pen were such as to evince an inten-
tion to claim a permanent proprietory interest. Also, the only state-
ments of the claimant bearing upon the question were those made at
least twelve years subsequent to the attempted definition of the
boundary. These statements, although sufficient to infer acquiescence
2 Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14, 19, 64 Pac. 936 (1901) (Italics added).
3 Noyes v. Douglas, 39 Wash. 314, 81 Pac. 724 (1905) ; Lindberg v. Davis, 164 Wash.
680, 4 P.2d 501 (1931).
4 Schlossmacher v. Beacon Place Co., 52 Wash. 588, 100 Pac. 1013 (1909).
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to the removal of the hedge, should have no bearing upon the legal title
which the running of the statutory period had placed in the plaintiff.5
The court's determination in favor of the defendant must necessarily
rest upon its finding that the plaintiff did not intend to claim to the
visible boundary. Here the court treated the subjective intent of the
claimant as controlling rather than the objective intent as shown by
his acts with reference to the disputed area. Furthermore there was no
showing that the claim of the plaintiff or his predecessor was condi-
tioned upon the outcome of an intended subsequent survey or other
determination of the location of the true boundary. Thus the intent
required by the court was the categorical one to claim regardless of
what might later develop.
Far better reason is displayed by the rule as it stood prior to the
Brown case. It is generally recognized that the underlying principle
of the doctrine of adverse possession is to force settlement of title dis-
putes within a reasonable time following the initial occurrence of such
dispute. Open and notorious possession is required to allow the legal
owner notice of the interference with his right to exclusive possession.
Hostile possession is required in contradistinction to possession with
the permission of the legal owner. Under the rule as laid down by the
leading Washington case where the adversity is determined by looking
to the acts and declarations of the claimant as evincing the intent with
which the claim is made, the purpose of the doctrine is carried out. All
requirements of the doctrine are met and the "honest" claimant is not
deprived of the operation of the doctrine merely because he does not
hold the positive intention to claim something which has not been con-
veyed to him by his title deed. The rule of the Brown case, on the other
hand, denies the benefit of this doctrine to all except those who hold
the subjective intention to claim regardless of whether they have legal
title.' The placing of such importance upon the subjective intent of the
claimant is an open invitation to the use of well coached witnesses.
Furthermore, the use of the subjective intent of the claimant to de-
5 "We have on several occasions approved a statement which appears in Towles v.
Hamilton, 94 Neb. 588, 143 N.W. 935, that: 'It is elementary that where the title has
become fully vested by disseizin so long continued as to bar an action, it cannot be
divested by parol abandonment or relinquishment or by verbal declarations of the
disseizor, nor by any other act short of what would be required in a case where his title
was by deed.'" Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wn.2d 429, 431, 206 P.2d 332 (1949).
6 "... the term 'hostile', as here used, does not import enmity or ill will, but rather
imports that the claimant is in possession as owner, in contradistinction to holding in
recognition of or subordination to the true owner." King v. Bassindale, 127 Wash. 189,
192, 220 Pac. 777 (1923).
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termine the adversity of the claim will be little aid to the true owner.
Upon being apprized of the interference with his right by the claimant
he will not have benefit of knowledge of the claimant's subjective intent
but can rely only upon what the claimant indicates his intention to be
by his acts and declarations. It would indeed be a risky venture to
postpone eviction or other proper action upon the hope that the claim-
ant does not intend to claim regardless of whether the visible line is in
fact the true line.
Adequate authority from other jurisdictions is found to support the
rules of both the Brown case and those decisions handed down by the
court prior to that case.' The fact remains that the court has apparently
switched its position with respect to the requirements of adverse pos-
session where there exists a mistake as to the location of a boundary
line.
Real Property-Riparian Rights-Floodwaters and the Common
Enemy Doctrine. In Sund v. Keating,8 the defendant upper riparian
owner to the plaintiff removed a portion of a natural ridge located
approximately sixty feet from the main channel of a stream, such ridge
constituting a barrier which protected the land of both the plaintiff and
the defendant from innundation during the course of normal seasonal
floods peculiar to the area. The earth obtained in the removal was used
to raise a certain part of the defendants land in order that surface
waters might flow off more readily. As a result of this removal the
plaintiff's oyster beds were damaged by waters which broke through
the weakened part of the ridge onto the defendant's land and thence
onto the land of the plaintiff during a flood flow of normal proportion.
Action was brought for damage resulting from the negligent diversion
of the stream. The trial court recognized the contention of the defend-
ant that floodwaters were surface waters to which a landowner might
protect himself as to a common enemy, any resultant injury being
damnum absque injuria,' but found for the plaintiff under the rule that
7 There exist two definite lines of authority wtih respect to the adversity of a claim
made under mistake: (1) The fact of the mistake is immaterial; the adversity of the
claim is to be determined by the visible possession rather than from the invisible motives
of the claimant's mind. French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831).
(2) Possession under mistake, without the intention to claim unconditionally will not
be adverse. "It must be an intention to claim title to all land within a certain boundary
on the face of the earth, whether it shall eventually be found to be the correct one or
not." Preble v. Maine, 85 Me. 260, 27 At. 149, 150, 21 L.R.A. 829, 35 Am. St. Rep. 366
(1893). The subjective intent of the claimant has been held immaterial. Vade v. Sick-
ler, 118 Colo. 236, 195 P2d 390 (1948).
8143 Wash. Dec. 32, 259 P.2d 1113 (1953).
9 Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 44 Pac. 113 (1896).
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one may not artificially divert surface waters collected upon his land
within the confines of natural barriers to the detriment of his adjoining
landowner. °
Upon appeal, the court affirmed the judgment but held that flood-
waters contained within the normal flood banks are not surface waters
to which the common enemy doctrine applies but are part of the water-
course which a riparian owner may not divert, in the words of the
court, "negligently or wilfully."
Although negligence upon the part of the defendant was found, it is
not completely clear from the decision in the Sund case that liability
for diversion must be predicated upon negligence where the stream is
not intentionally diverted. There is language in the opinion which would
support the contention that the diverter would be liable for any injury
incurred as a result of the diversion regardless of whether the reason-
able man would foresee the possibility of such diversion as a result of
his acts. Liability for negligent diversion or obstruction of a water-
course has been recognized in other jurisdictions."'1
The courts of the various jurisdictions are far from uniform in their
treatment of overflow waters of a stream. By the decision in this case
the Washington Court has joined the majority in a recognition that
overflow waters under certain conditions are to be treated as part of
the watercourse and subject to riparian rights and liabilities.- Many,
upon finding that the overflow is not part of the watercourse, treat such
water as surface water to which the common enemy doctrine applies,
allowing the landowner to protect his property without liability for any
injury occurring to adjoining land." Prior to the decision of the Sund
case, the Washington court had held that all floodwaters were to be
treated as surface waters. Still other courts distinguish these overflow
waters from surface waters but apply the common enemy doctrine
nevertheless."
The problem, and an apparent conflict of authority, arises in the
10 Nuyes v. Cossellman, 29 Wash. 635, 70 Pac. 61 (1902).
11 Moore Spinning Co. v. Boston Ice Co., 210 Mass. 364, 97 N.E. 62 (1912) (diver-
sion) ; Jones v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 67 S.C. 181, 45 S.E. 188 (1903) (obstruction);
Uhl v. Ohio River Ry., 56 W.Va. 494, 49 S.E. 378 (1904) (obstruction).
12 O'Connell v. East Tenn. V. & G. Ry., 87 Ga. 246, 13 S.E. 489 (1891) ; Fordham
v. N.P. Ry., 30 Mont. 421, 76 Pac. 1040 (1904) ; Morris v. City of Council Bluffs, 67
Iowa 343, 25 N.W. 274 (1885) ; Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 194 Pac. 34
(1920).
13 Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 44 Pac. 113 (1896) ; Harvey v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
63 Wash. 669, 116 Pac. 464 (1911).
14 Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 194 Pac. 34 (1920); see also discussion in
Mogle v. Moore, 16 Cal.2d 1, 96 P.2d 147 (1939).
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determination of the point at which the overflow ceases to be part of
the watercourse. The case cited as authority by the Washington Court
in arriving at the decision of the Sund case laid down the rule that an
overflow flowing in a current contiguous to the main body of the stream,
or which spreads out over the surrounding land only to return when
the stream subsides, could not be termed surface water but remains
part of the watercourse. 5 In the formulation of this rule little emphasis
was placed upon the fact that the flood under determination did not
exceed in size those floods which ordinarily occurred in that region.
This factor was noted, however, in a later decision in which the court
applied the rule in their determination. Therein it was stated, "With
reasonable near approximation to accuracy, it may be laid down as a
general rule that all waters of a river which form one body, when
flowing within the boundaries within which they have been immemori-
ally acustomed to flow in times of ordinary floods, constitute waters of
the river, and are not surface waters."" This rule seems to be well
founded in reason, allowing a landowner to protect improvements
erected upon the land from floods of unusually large proportions which,
at the time of erection, he had little reason to expect to be within the
flood path. Accordingly it has been applied in many jurisdictions, both
as to cases involving the protection from floodwaters and those involv-
ing beneficial use of the water."
Certain courts, through their definition of an 'ordinary flow,' have
so changed this rule as virtually to introduce a new one. The Texas
court attaches liability for diversion only where the overflow does not
exceed "the line of highest ordinary flow." This in turn is defined as
11... the highest line of flow which the stream reaches and maintains
for a sufficient length of time to become characteristic -when its waters
are in their ordinary, normal, and usual condition, uninfluenced by
recent rainfall or surface run-off." 9 As a great proportion of the high
waters of a stream are caused by recent rainfall and surface run-off it
would seem that the rule as applied by the Texas court would limit the
extent of the watercourse to those waters which flow in the stream dur-
15 O'Connell v. East Tenn. V. & G. Ry., 87 Ga. 246, 13 S.E. 489 (1891).
'a Cairo V. C. Ry. v. Brevoort, 62 Fed. 129, 135 (C.C.D. Ind. 1894).
17 Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Eminent, 53 Neb. 237, 73 N.W. 540 (1897); Byrne v.
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 38 Minn. 212, 36 N.W. 339 (1888) ; Jones v. Seaboard
Airline Ry., 67 S.C. 181, 45 S.E. 188 (1903) ; -Uhl v. Ohio River Ry., 56 W.Va. 494,
49 S.E. 378 (1904) ; Dowlen v. Crowley, 170 Okla. 59, 37 P.2d 933 (1934).
28 Miller v. Madera Canal & Irrig Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 Pac. 502 (1909) ; Eastern Ore.
Land Co. v. Willow River L. & I. Co., 201 Fed. 203 (C.C.A. 9th 1912).
19 Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926) (Italics added).
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ing a major part of the year, leaving normal seasonal overflows to the
classification of surface waters. The text of the decision in the above
noted case indicates a feeling upon the part of the court that the appli-
cation of the broader rule adopted in most jurisdictions is incompatible
with their geographic area.
In some jurisdictions the distinction between an ordinary and an
extraordinary flood has been used only insofar as it bears upon the
forseeability of the volume of the flow." If the flow continues in one
body with the main current of the stream and is foreseeable by the use
of reasonable skill and judgment, liability for diversion will attach
although the flood may in fact be unusual or extraordinary.",
The courts have shown a decided reluctance to apply any of the
above tests where the area innundated is a broad alluvial valley. In
one such case, although finding for the defendant upon another ground,
the court indicated that a valley varying in width from one mile to
one mile and a half could not properly be called a watercourse.2 An-
other recognized the rule allowing a landowner to protect himself with-
out liability as to extraordinary floods but indicated it was highly
unreasonable to reach the result that the whole Mississippi valley was
a part of the watercourse.2
The cases do not indicate that overflow waters in times of ordinary
flood must meet the general definition of a watercourse2' to be termed
part of the watercourse and subject to riparian rights and liabilities. It
has been held that such waters need not be contained within visible
banks" and that no current is necessary.2"
The facts of the case herein reported would support the contention
that the overflow involved was part of the watercourse under any of
the above stated rules with exception, perhaps, of the Texas rule. It
might also be contended that it was within the general definition of a
20 Zollman v. Baltimore & O.S.W. Ry., 70 Ind. App. 395, 121 N.E. 135 (1918). See
also Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 23 Okla. 684, 102 Pac. 79 (1909), wherein the court
adopted the following definition set forth in 13 ENCY. oF LAw 686 (2d ed. 1939):
"An ordinary flood is one, the repetition of which, though at uncertain intervals, might,
by the exercise of ordinary diligence in investigating the character and habits of the
stream, have been anticipated."
21 Mendelson v. State, 218 App. Div. 210, 218 N.Y.S. 223 (1926).
22 Kansas City M. & B. Ry. v. Smith, 72 Miss. 677, 17 S. 78 (1895).
23 Cubbins v. Miss. River Comm., 241 U.S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671 (1916).
24 A watercourse is a stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and
sides or bank, and discharging itself in some other stream or body of water. Hutchinson
v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 Pac. 1059 (1909); also see GOULD,
WATERS, § 41, p. 9 (3d ed. 1900).
25 Miller v. Madera Canal & Irrig. Co., 155 Cal. 59 99 Pac. 502 (1909).2 0Uhl v. Ohio River Ry. Co., 56 W.Va. 494, 49 S.E. 378 (1904).
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watercourse. This leaves an open question as to the course to be taken
by the Washington Court when faced with the diversion of an unusual
overflow, one which is unusual but forseeable, or one which could not
be brought within the confines of the general definition of a water-
course.
Real Property-Contract to Convey "Free from Encumbrance"-
Duty to Inquire as to Easements. In Somers v. Leiser,27 the plaintiff
sought to recover unpaid installments due from the defendant vendee
pursuant to the terms of a contract of sale for certain realty. The
defendant sought by way of affirmative relief rescission of the contract
and asked for the return of moneys paid by him under the contract.
The contract of sale provided for the conveyance of the realty "free
from encumbrance, except" a certain stipulated mortgage and it was
claimed by the defendant that the plaintiff could not convey in accord-
ance with this provision. The defendant, in his appellate brief, set
forth two encumbrances, either of which was claimed by him to be
sufficient to prevent the conveyance of the realty in accordance with
the contract. There existed a granted easement sixty feet in width run-
ning through the property and held by the city for public street and
utility purposes. The property was further encumbered by the existence
of a garage almost wholly within this easement.
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the
installments due, finding as a matter of fact that the defendant had
actual knowledge of the existence of a gravel road twelve feet wide
which ran through the property upon the location of the easement. The
court concluded that this knowledge would cause a reasonable man to
make inquiry from which he would have discovered the prior recorded
grant of easement to the city in the width of sixty feet and that the
garage rested substantially within the bounds of this easement.
Upon appeal the court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff hold-
ing that the evidence supported the findings and conclusions of the
lower court and stated, "The applicable rule of law to the factual situ-
ation presented is that a provision in a contract to convey real estate
'free of encumbrances' does not refer to granted easements, permanent
in character, which are either known to a vendee, or the existence of
which he should have known or ascertained had he made a reasonable
investigation. 28
27143 Wash. Dec. 60, 259 P.2d 843 (1953).
28 Id. at 62, 259 P.2d at 844.
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Rescission may be had in equity upon grounds of misrepresentation,
fraud, or where it is apparent that the vendor will be unable, at the
time when his performance is due, to substantially comply with the
terms of the contract.2
Generally, upon entering a contract for the sale of realty, the vendor
assumes the burden of conveying a good and merchantible title free
from encumbrances even though no such specific provision is contained
within the contract."° The Washington court has accepted the general
definition of an encumbrance: "A burden upon land depreciative of its
value, such as a lien, easement, or servitude, which though adverse to
the interest of the land owner, does not conflict with his conveyance of
the land in fee."'" Both easements granted to third persons32 and build-
ings encroaching upon public streets and alleys3 have been held to
prevent the conveyance of a title free from encumbrance. Although
such encumbrances prevent the conveyance of the merchantible title
required even in absence of the specific provision against encumbrances,
it is generally held that a provision for conveyance "free of encum-
brances" does not refer to all encumbrances. With but few exceptions"'
it is the rule that such a provision does not refer to easements of a
permanent character of which the vendee has actual knowledge at the
time of entering the contract.3 5 The basis of this rule seems sound and
simple. It is that the vendee, having actual knowledge of the existence
of certain easements of a type which the vendor cannot cause to be
removed, presumably accepts the promise of the vendor to convey sub-
ject to these encumbrances.3 " There is little reason to presume other-
29 Becker v. Clark, 83 Wash. 37, 145 Pac. 65 (1914) ; French v. C. D. & E. Inv. Co.,
114 Wash. 416, 195 Pac. 521 (1921). For a general discussion of the remedy of
rescission based upon fraud see Note, 5 WASH. L. REv. 135 (1930) ; of misrepresenta-
tion, see Note, 8 WASH. L. REV. 47 (1933) ; of the remedy of rescission based upon
failure to remove encumbrances, see Note, 9 WAsH. L. REv. 121 (1934).
30 Davis v. Lee, 52 Wash. 330, 100 Pac. 752 (1909).
31 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 158 (2d ed. 1896) as quoted in Green v. Tidball, 26
Wash. 338, 343 (1901) and Linne v. Bredes, 43 Wash. 540, 86 Pac. 858 (1906). It is
important to note that before a burden may be termed an "encumbrance" it must detract
from the value of the land. Although it has been held that a provision to convey free
of encumbrance does not apply to easements for public highways it has been indicated
that the underlying reason for such a holding lies in the fact that the highway in
question does not detract from the value of the land and thus is not an encumbrance.
See Sandum v. Johnson, 142 Minn. 368, 142 N.W. 878 (1913).
32 Wingard v. Copeland, 64 Wash. 214, 116 Pac. 670 (1911) ; Fagan v. Walters, 115
Wash. 454, 197 Pac. 635 (1921).
33 Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N.Y. 495, 109 N.E. 577 (1915) ; Vassar Holding
Co. v. Wuensch, 100 N.J.Eq. 147, 135 Atl. 88 (1926).
34 Evans v. Taylor, 177 Pa. St. Rep. 286, 35 Atl. 635 (1896).
35 Ferguson v. Edgar, 178 Cal. 17, 171 Pac. 1061 (1918) ; Suter v. Mason, 147 Ark.
505, 227 S.W. 782 (1921) ; M'Whorter v. Forney, 69 Wash. 414, 125 Pac. 164 (1912).
36 Ferguson v. Edgar, supra note 35; Suter v. Mason, supra note 35. It is also perti-
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wise since to do so would be to presume that the vendee intended to
enter a contract which he knew could never be performed by the ven-
dor. If the easements are of a type which may be removed, or if the
vendee does not have knowledge of their existence, there remains no
valid basis for the presumption that he intended to accept the en-
cumbered land.
The rule of the Somers case, however, is a considerable extension of
the majority rule. The rule of the instant case is that a provision in the
contract of sale for conveyance "free from encumbrance" does not
refer to any easement the existence of which is ascertainable by a
reasonable inspection. The effect of the rule is to charge the vendee
with knowledge of all such easements whether or not he makes the in-
spection and regardless of whether he has or has not actual knowledge
of their existence.
Although there is a lack of Washington case authority directly in
point, the majority rule has been applied in Washington. In an early
case the court held that knowledge upon the part of a vendee of the
existence of two roads located upon the property did not preclude the
vendee from obtaining a rescission in the absence of actual knowledge
upon his part that the roads had become public highways by prescrip-
tion."7 A recent case, however, announced the rule as applied in the
Somers case."8
It is apparent that all purchasers of realty must use an increased
amount of care either in making pre-contractual investigations of the
land which they intend to purchase or in drafting the provisions of the
contract. Probably increased precautionary measures should be taken
in both procedures in view of the fact that somewhat stronger ter-
minology than "free from encumbrance" is required to adequately pro-
tect the vendee and that, as yet, exactly what terminology will satisfy
the need is unknown. The hazard for the purchaser of small homes is
nent to note that if the encumbrance is of a permanent -nature and the vendee has
knowledge of its existence, he undoubtedly considered the value of the land with refer-
ence to the existence of th encumbrance and thereby suffers no injury.
37 M'Whorter v. Forney, srupra note 35. Also sie Fagan v. Walters, 115 Wash. 454,
197 Pac 635 (1921) and Moore v. Clark', 157 Wash. 573, 289 Pac. 520 (1930) wvherein
the holdings are consistent with the view that lack of actual knowledge of ascertainable
encumbrances will allow the vendee to rescind.
88 Bruckart v. Cook, 30 Wn2d 4, 190 P2d 725 (1948). The action for rescission in
this case was based upon misrepresentation and although the court cited 55 Am. Jua.
VENDOR & PURCHASER § 258 (1946) which discusses warranties in the contract, it seems
possible that the court in stating the rule as applied in the Somers case had in mind an
action based upon misrepresentation rather than an action for breach of contractual
warranty to convey merchantable title.
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made greater by the common practice of realtors who use standard
contract blanks containing the fatal terminology. The entire situation
is truly one of caveat emptor.
LAURENCE S. MooE
Personal Property-Bailments-Agreement to Return Goods in
Same Condition. In Metropolitan Park District v. Olympia Athletic
Club,8" plaintiff rented bleacher seats to defendant for an exhibition.
These were destroyed by fire through no negligence on defendant's
part. Embodied in the rental contract was the phrase "agree to use
every possible care in handling them and to replace any parts damaged
while in our possession and to return them in the same condition in
which we received them." Defendant was held responsible in damages
for their loss.
Where the bailment transaction is mutually beneficial to both parties,
it is well settled that the bailee is required to use ordinary diligence in
protecting the subject-matter of the bailment from damage or loss.'"
There is a split of authority on the use of the words "and to return them
in the same condition . . . ," with the majority of courts holding such
words impose no additional liability; while a minority construe the
effect of such words as to impose the liability of an absolute insurer
on the bailee."
Apparently this case was one of first impression in Washington, as
the Court discussed the conflicting views above and by adopting the
minority view made the bailee in this case an absolute insurer. This
holding seems unnecessary as the contract in the instant case embodied
the additional phrases "agree to use every possible care in handling
them, and to replace any parts damaged while in our possession...."
Clearly these go beyond the ordinary obligation implied by law in a
mutually beneficial bailment. Where such additional phrases are used,
a majority of jurisdictions hold such a bailee liable irrespective of his
negligence or fault." Hence it can now be argued that Washington has
adopted the view that a bailee may enlarge his common law liability
with a contract provision promising return of the property in as good
condition as when bailed.
RicHAaR K. QuiNN
89 42 Wn.2d 179, 254 P.2d 475 (1953).
40 Thompson v. Seattle Park Co., 94 Wash. 539, 162 Pac. 994 (1917); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pacific Transfer Co., 120 Wash. 665, 208 Pac. 55 (1922).
416 Am. JUR. BAILMENTS, § 182 (1950).
4.26 JuR. BAILMENTS, § 183 (1950).
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Community Property-Tort Liability. In Lafrainboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn2d 198
(1953), plaintiff, mother of a six year old girl, arranged for defendant and his wife to
care for the child while she was in Alaska. Defendant took indecent liberties with
the child. Plaintiff, as guardian ad litem, asks damages against defendant's com-
munity property. Held: The husband was managing community property at the
time he committed the act; the community is liable. The holding is in line with the
Court's enunciated policy of giving wide range in community property cases to the
scope of the husband's statutory managerial powers in tort actions. See Comment,
23 WASHi. L. Rnv. 259 (1948).
Real Property-Adverse Possession-Segregation of Mineral and Surface Rights for
Tax Purposes. In McCoy v Lowrie, 422d 24, 252 P.2d 415 (1953), the plaintiff sought
to obtain title to certain mineral rights under the provisions of RCW 7.28.080, which
permits any person having color of title to vacant and unoccupied land to obtain title
by paying taxes upon such land for a period of seven successive years. There had
been a prior severance of title to the mineral rights and title to the surface rights,
but no segregation for taxation purposes. The deed of conveyance to the plaintiff
contained no indication of the prior severance.. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed.
Since, where there has been no segregation for taxation purposes, payment of the
taxes on the land does not constitute payment of the taxes on the mineral rights.
Torrens Act-Execution Creditor Under Own Levy not Purchaser "for Value in
Good Faith." Finley v. Finley, 143 Wash. Dec. 696, 264 P2d 246 (1953), was a
divorce action in which the wife joined, as defendant, the, husband's execution credi-
tor for purpose of quieting title to certain real property. The property, purchased
from the separate funds of the plaintiff during marriage, had been erroneously
registered as community property under RCW 65.12 (Torrens Act). The defendant
execution creditor had purchased the property at an execution sale resulting from his
own levy. In reversing judgment for defendant, the court held that an execution
creditor who purchases land at an execution sale of his own levy is not a purchaser
"for value and in good faith" under RCW 65.12.195, and is not entitled to its pro-
tection. Hence, the wife was entitled to show that although the property was regis-
tered in the name of the community, it was her separate property, and not subject to
execution to satisfy a judgment against the husband.
SALES
The cases handed down in 1953 added little to the law of sales. In
some instances appeals were taken that seem, in retrospect, to have
been ill-advised. It is elementary, of course, that the primary respon-
sibility of the Supreme Court is to resolve issues of law, not to review
findings of fact. Nevertheless, in at least three of the cases in the field
of sales,' the court is found in the unfortunate position of having to base
its discussion almost solely upon factual issues. In none did the appeal
I Madden v. Herzog, 42 Wn.2d 666, 257 P2d 779 (1953) ; Lacey Plywood Co. v.
Wienker, 42 Wn.2d 719, 258 P.2d 477 (1953); Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wn2d 473,
256 P.2d 298 (1953).
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